Optimal Impartial Selection by Fischer, Felix & Klimm, Max
ar
X
iv
:1
31
0.
86
31
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  3
1 O
ct 
20
13
Optimal Impartial Selection∗
Felix Fischer
†
Max Klimm
‡
Abstract
We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nom-
inations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and
Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are
selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a
process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation
awards the prize to an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject
to impartiality, this is best possible.
1 Introduction
We consider a situation where members of a set of agents nominate other agents from the set for a
prize and the goal is to award the prize to an agent who receives a large number of nominations. This
situation arises naturally, for example, when representatives are selected from within a group or
when publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. While nominations
are at the discretion of the nominating agents, it is often reasonable to assume that agents are
impartial to the selection of others and will nominate who they think should receive the prize
as long as they cannot influence their own chances of receiving it. Indeed, the assumption of
impartiality was previously made, and justified, in the very same setting [2, 13].
Formally, the situation can be captured by a directed graph with n vertices, one for each agent,
in which edges correspond to nominations. A selection mechanism then chooses a vertex for any
given graph, and impartiality requires that the chances of a particular vertex to be chosen do
not depend on its outgoing edges. It is easy to see that an impartial mechanism cannot always
select a vertex with maximum indegree, corresponding to an agent with a maximum number of
nominations, even when n = 2. We therefore aim at maximizing the indegree of the selected vertex
relative to the maximum indegree, and call a mechanism α-optimal, for α ≤ 1, if for any graph
the former is at least α times the latter. We focus here on the selection of a single agent, but note
that it is an interesting question whether optimal mechanism for the general case can be obtained
directly from mechanisms for selecting a single agent or whether their design requires additional
techniques.
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State of the Art Alon et al. [2] and Holzman and Moulin [13] showed independently that
deterministic impartial mechanisms are extremely limited, and must sometimes select an agent
with zero nominations even though agents are being nominated, or an agent with one nomination
when another agent receives n− 1 nominations.
On the other hand, Alon et al. proposed a simple randomized mechanism that partitions the
agents into two sets S1 and S2 and selects an agent from S2 who among agents in this set receives
a maximum number of nominations by agents in S1. By linearity of expectation the mechanism
is at least 1/4-optimal, and a situation with a single nomination shows that it cannot do better.
A somewhat closer inspection of situations with one or two nominations shows that no impartial
mechanism can be better than 1/2-optimal. While these bounds are almost trivial, no improve-
ments have been obtained that hold for general values of n, despite considerable efforts. Moreover,
improving the lower bound appears just as difficult in the special case where each agent submits
exactly one nomination, as considered by Holzman and Moulin. This is somewhat embarrassing,
as the mechanism of Alon et al. should intuitively be better than 1/4-optimal as soon as there is
more than just a single nomination.
Our Contribution Alon et al.’s analysis of the 2-partition mechanism is tight and yields a con-
stant approximation ratio, only a factor of two away from the best possible one. Quite strikingly,
however, the analysis requires almost no understanding of the mechanism or the problem the mech-
anism is trying to solve. As a consequence it does not lead to stronger bounds for special cases,
like the setting with one nomination per agent studied by Holzman and Moulin, and cannot be
extended to more complicated mechanisms.
Our first result attempts to close this gap in our understanding of the 2-partition mechanism, by
providing a lower bound on its performance relative to the maximum indegree. Among other things,
this yields a lower bound of 3/8 for the case where each agent submits at least one nomination. Our
analysis uses a novel adversarial argument that allows us to abstract from the underlying graph
structure and isolate the critical aspects of difficult problem instances.
More interestingly, our analysis suggests a natural generalization of the 2-partition mechanism
that partitions the set of agents into k > 2 sets and iteratively considers the nominations submitted
by agents in more and more of these sets, to fewer and fewer candidates in the remaining sets.
Intuitively this increases the probability of each individual nomination to be counted, which is
particularly important in the difficult cases with a small overall number of nominations. Exactly
how information from an earlier stage of the mechanism can be used without a negative effect on
later stages turns out to be somewhat intricate.
We then generalize the adversarial analysis to show that the k-partition mechanism provides an
approximation ratio of (k− 1)/2k, which approaches the upper bound of 1/2 as k tends to infinity.
This implicitly provides an analysis of a limiting mechanism, in which agents are considered one
by one according to a random permutation.
We finally give the first non-trivial bounds for settings without abstentions, where the permuta-
tion mechanism is at least 7/12-optimal and at most 2/3-optimal, and no impartial mechanism can
be more than 3/4-optimal. Quite intriguingly, the exact upper bounds approach 3/4 from below as
the number of agents grows and are tight for small numbers of agents. This can be seen as evidence
that optimal mechanisms in this case might be rather difficult to find.
2
Related Work and Applications Impartial decision making was first considered by de Clippel
et al. [5], for the case of a divisible resource to be shared among a set of agents. While the difference
between a divisible resource and the indivisible resource considered in this paper disappears for
randomized mechanisms, de Clippel et al. studied mechanisms with a more general message space
that allows for fractional nominations, and at the same time aimed for weaker requirements to be
achieved besides impartiality.
Alon et al. [2] framed the problem considered here as one of designing approximately optimal
strategyproof mechanisms without payments, an agenda proposed by Procaccia and Tennenholtz
[15] and earlier by Dekel et al. [6]. Strategyproofness requires that an agent maximizes its utility
by truthfully revealing its preferences and is equivalent to impartiality if the utility of an agent
only depends on its chances of being selected. While this assumption seems somewhat restrictive,
Alon et al. pointed out that their results in fact hold for any setting where agents give their own
selection priority over that of their nominees.
Strategyproof selection is an important component of the peer review process for scientific
articles and project proposals. For its Sensors and Sensing Systems program, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) recently introduced a mechanism in which proposals are reviewed by other
applicants, and acceptance of an applicant’s own proposal depends in part on the extent to which
the reviews submitted by the applicant agree with other reviews of the same proposals. The specific
mechanism used by the NSF was originally proposed by Merrifield and Saari [14] in the context of
allocation of telescope time. Whether the mechanism provides the right incentives in peer review is
debatable, but its lack of impartiality, which in this case is deliberate, would make it very hard to
show any formal incentive properties. By contrast, our results allow for a separation of preferences
regarding an agent’s own selection and those regarding the selection of others, and can in principle
be combined with peer prediction techniques [e.g., 16] to provide strict incentives for the truthful
evaluation of other agents. The exact properties achievable by such hybrid mechanisms deserve
further investigation.
Impartial selection is also more distantly related to work in distributed computing on leader
election [e.g., 1, 4, 8, 3] and work on the manipulation of reputation systems [e.g., 11]. Leader
election seeks to guarantee the selection of a non-malicious agent in the presence of malicious agents
trying to manipulate the selection process. Work on reputation systems often considers models with
more complex preference and message spaces, where maximization of a one-dimensional objective
does not suffice.
The 2-partition mechanism, finally, is reminiscent of random sampling in unlimited-supply
auctions [10, 12, 9] and combinatorial auctions [7]. It will be interesting to see whether our more
complicated mechanisms and analysis techniques can be applied to these settings in a meaningful
way.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, let Gn = {(N,E) : N = {1, . . . , n}, E ⊆ (N×N)\
⋃
i∈N ({i}×{i})} be the set of directed
graphs with n vertices and no loops. Let G =
⋃
n∈N Gn. For G = (N,E) ∈ G, S ⊆ N , and i ∈ N ,
let δ−S (i,G) = |{(j, i) ∈ E : G = (N,E), j ∈ S}| denote the indegree of vertex i from vertices in
S. We use δ−(i,G) as a shorthand for δ−N (i,G), denote ∆(G) = maxi∈N δ
−(i,G), and write δ−(i)
instead of δ−(i,G) and ∆ instead of ∆(G) if G is clear from the context.
A selection mechanism for G is then given by a family of functions f : Gn → [0, 1]
n that maps
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each graph to a probability distribution on its vertices. In a slight abuse of notation, we use f to
refer to both the mechanism and individual functions from the family. Mechanism f is impartial
on G′ ⊆ G if on this set of graphs the probability of selecting vertex i does not depend on its
outgoing edges, i.e., if for every pair of graphs G = (N,E) and G′ = (N,E′) in G′ and every i ∈ N ,
(f(G))i = (f(G
′))i whenever E \ ({i} × V ) = E
′ \ ({i} × V ). All mechanisms we consider are
impartial on G, and we simply refer to such mechanisms as impartial mechanisms. Mechanism f
is α-optimal on G′ ⊆ G, for α ≤ 1, if for any graph in G′ the expected degree of the vertex selected
by f differs from the maximum degree by a factor of at most α, i.e., if
inf
G∈G
∆(G)>0
Ei∼f(G)[δ
−(i,G)]
∆(G)
≥ α.
We call a mechanism α-optimal if it is α-optimal on G, and approximately optimal if it α-optimal
for some constant α.
As far as impartiality and approximate optimality are concerned, we can restrict our attention
to symmetric mechanisms. Mechanism f is symmetric if it is invariant with respect to renaming of
the vertices, i.e., if for every G = (N,E) ∈ G, every i ∈ N , and every permutation π : N → N ,
(f(Gπ))π(i) = (f(G))i,
where Gπ = (N,Eπ) with Eπ = {(π(i), π(j)) : (i, j) ∈ E}. For a given mechanism f , denote by fs
the mechanism obtained by applying a random permutation π to the vertices to the input graph,
invoking f , and permuting the result by the inverse of π, such that for all n ∈ N, G ∈ Gn, and
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (
fs(G)
)
i
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
(
f(Gπ)
)
πi
,
where Sn is the set of all permutations π = (π1, . . . , pn) of a set of n elements. The following result
is straightforward.
Lemma 1 (Holzman and Moulin [13]). Let f be a selection mechanism that is impartial and α-
optimal on G′ ⊆ G. Then fs is impartial, α-optimal, and symmetric on G
′.
3 The 2-Partition Mechanism
We begin our investigation with a more detailed analysis of the 2-partition mechanism proposed by
Alon et al. [2]. The mechanism first assigns each vertex independently and uniformly at random to
one of two sets A1 and A2, such that A1∪A2 = N , A1∩A2 = ∅, and P[i ∈ A1] = P[i ∈ A2] = 1/2 for
all i ∈ N . Then it returns a vertex from A2 that has maximum indegree from vertices in A1, or a
vertex chosen uniformly at random from N in case A2 = ∅. A formal description of the mechanism
is given in Figure 1.
The 2-partition mechanism is obviously impartial, as any given vertex is either in A1, in which
case it will never be selected, or in A2, in which case its outgoing edges have no influence on the
outcome of the mechanism. It is also easy to see that the mechanism is 1/4-optimal. For an
arbitrary graph G and a particular vertex i∗ in G with degree ∆ = ∆(G), we have that P[i∗ ∈
A2] = 1/2 and, by linearity of expectation, E[δ
−
A1
(i∗) | i∗ ∈ A2] = E[δ
−
A1
(i∗)] = δ−N (i
∗)/2 = ∆/2.
The expected degree of the selected vertex is thus at least ∆/2 with probability at least 1/2, i.e.,
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Input: Graph G = (N,E)
Output: Vertex i ∈ N
1 Assign each i ∈ N independently and uniformly at random to one of two sets A1 and A2;
2 if A2 = ∅ then return a vertex chosen uniformly at random from N ;
3 Return a vertex chosen uniformly at random from argmaxi∈A2 δ
−
A1
(i);
Figure 1: The 2-partition mechanism
p1 p2 p3
Figure 2: No impartial mechanism is more than 1/2-optimal
at least ∆/4. A graph with a single edge shows that this result is in fact tight. An upper bound
on α for any impartial mechanism can be obtained by considering the two graphs in Figure 2, and
the probabilities p1, p2, and p3 with which certain vertices in these graphs are selected. Due to
symmetry, which we can assume by Lemma 1, p1 = p2 and thus p1 ≤ 1/2. On the other hand,
p1 = p3 by impartiality, so the expected degree of the vertex selected in the right graph is at most
1/2 and the claim follows.
This rather straightforward analysis does not lead to a tight result, but it is unsatisfactory in
particular because it provides no information about the performance of the mechanism on more
complicated graphs, and no cues what a better mechanism might look like. We will gain both from
the proof of the following lemma, which establishes a lower bound on the expected degree of the
selected vertex relative to the maximum degree ∆(G).
Lemma 2. On any graph G with maximum degree ∆ = ∆(G), the 2-partition mechanism is α2(∆)-
optimal, where
α2(∆) =
1
∆2∆
∆∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
·min
{
∆
2
, k
}
.
Proof. Let i∗ ∈ N such that δ−(i∗) = ∆, and denote by X the degree of the agent selected by the
2-partition mechanism. Then X is a random variable subject to the internal randomness of the
mechanism, and we will be interested in its expected value E[X].
Let A = (A1, A2) be the partition selected in Line 1 of the 2-partition mechanism in Figure 1,
and consider an arbitrary set S ⊆ N \ {i∗} of vertices other than i∗. We begin by bounding
E[X |A1 \{i
∗} = S], i.e., the expected value of X given that A1 = S or A1 = S ∪{i
∗}. To this end,
let z(S) and a(S) denote the indegree of i∗ from S and the maximum degree of any other element
of N \ S from S, i.e., z(S) = δ−S (i
∗) and a(S) = maxi∈N\(S∪{i∗}) δ
−
S (i).
Assume for now that S 6= ∅ and S 6= N \ {i∗}. Then, E[X |A1 = S] = ∆ if z(S) > a(S),
E[X |A1 = S] ≥ a(S) if a(S) ≥ z(S), and E[X |A1 = S∪{i
∗}] ≥ a(S). Note here that the expected
value of X only increases if there is an edge from i∗ to a vertex for which a(S) is attained. Since
the events where A1 = S and A1 = S ∪ {i
∗} occur with equal probability,
E[X |A1 \ {i
∗} = S] ≥
χ
(
z(S) > a(S)
)
∆+
(
1− χ
(
z(S) > a(S)
))
a(S)
2
+
a(S)
2
= a(S) +
1
2
χ
(
z(S) > a(S)
)(
∆− a(S)
)
,
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where χ denotes the indicator function on binary events, i.e., χ(E) = 1 if event E takes place and
χ(E) = 0 otherwise. Depending on the value of z(S), the right-hand side is minimized either for
a(S) = 0 or for a(S) = z(S), and it becomes equal to χ(z(S) > 0) · ∆2 when a(S) = 0 and equal to
z(S) when a(S) = z(S). In summary,
E[X |S \ {i∗} = S] ≥ min
{
χ
(
z(S) > 0
)
·
∆
2
, z(S)
}
= min
{
∆
2
, z(S)
}
. (1)
We can now lift the assumption that S 6= ∅ and S 6= N \ {i∗}. If S = ∅, then z(S) = 0 and (1)
holds trivially. If S = N \ {i∗}, then z(S) = ∆, and i∗ is in N \ S and therefore chosen by the
2-partition mechanism with probability 1/2. Thus E[X |A1 \ {i
∗} = S] ≥ ∆/2 = min{∆/2, z(S)},
and (1) is again satisfied.
By construction of the 2-partition mechanism, each vertex belongs to A1 with probability 1/2,
so z(S) = δ−A1(i
∗) is distributed according to the binomial distribution with ∆ trials and success
probability 1/2. We thus have that
E[X] =
∑
S⊆N
P[A1 \ {i
∗} = S] · E[X |A1 \ {i
∗} = S]
≥
∆∑
k=0
∑
S⊆N
z(S)=k
P[A1 \ {i
∗} = S] ·min
{
∆
2
, k
}
=
1
2∆
∆∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
·min
{
∆
2
, k
}
.
This finally implies that
α2(∆) ≥
1
∆2∆
∆∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
·min
{
∆
2
, k
}
as claimed.
We now use Lemma 2 to derive a closed form expression for α2(∆).
Theorem 1. On any graph G with maximum degree ∆ = ∆(G), the 2-partition mechanism is
α2(∆)-optimal, where
α2(∆) =


1
4 if ∆ = 1,
1
2 −
1
2∆+2
( ∆
∆/2
)
if ∆ ≥ 2 and even,
α2(∆− 1) if ∆ ≥ 3 and odd.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 it is straightforward to calculate that α2(1) = 1/4.
Next assume that ∆ is strictly positive and even. Then, by Lemma 2,
α2(∆) =
1
∆2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
· k +
1
∆2∆
(
∆
∆/2
)
·
∆
2
+
1
∆2∆
∆∑
k=∆
2
+1
(
∆
k
)
·
∆
2
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By symmetry of the binomial distribution with success probability 1/2,
1
2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
=
1
2∆
∆∑
k=∆
2
+1
(
∆
k
)
and thus
1
2
·
1
2∆
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
=
1
2
·
1
2∆
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
2∆
∆∑
k=∆
2
+1
(
∆
k
)
=
1
2
.
Using the latter, we obtain
α2(∆) =
1
∆2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
· k +
1
2
·
1
∆2∆
(
∆
∆/2
)
·
∆
2
+
1
4
=
1
2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=1
(∆− 1)!
(∆− k)!(k − 1)!
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
4
=
1
2∆
∆
2
−1∑
k=1
(
∆− 1
k − 1
)
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
4
=
1
2
·
1
2∆−1
∆
2
−2∑
k=0
(
∆− 1
k
)
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
4
.
Also by symmetry of the binomial distribution,
1
2∆−1
∆
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆− 1
k
)
=
1
2
,
and we obtain
α2(∆) =
1
4
+
1
2
(
1
2
−
1
2∆−1
(
∆− 1
∆/2− 1
))
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
=
1
2
−
1
2∆
(
∆− 1
∆/2− 1
)
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
.
Since ∆ − 1 is odd,
(∆−1
∆/2
)
=
( ∆−1
∆/2−1
)
and thus
( ∆
∆/2
)
=
(∆−1
∆/2
)
+
( ∆−1
∆/2−1
)
= 2
( ∆−1
∆/2−1
)
. We conclude
that
α2(∆) =
1
2
−
1
2∆+1
(
∆
∆/2
)
+
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
=
1
2
−
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
as claimed.
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Finally assume that ∆ ≥ 3 and odd. Then, by Lemma 2,
α2(∆) =
1
∆2∆
⌊∆2 ⌋∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
· k +
1
∆2∆
∆∑
k=⌈∆2 ⌉
(
∆
k
)
·
∆
2
.
By symmetry of the binomial distribution with success probability 1/2,
1
2∆
∆∑
k=⌈∆2 ⌉
(
∆
k
)
=
1
2
,
and we obtain
α2(∆) =
1
∆2∆
∆−1
2∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
· k +
1
4
=
1
2∆
∆−1
2∑
k=1
(∆− 1)!
(∆− k)!(k − 1)!
+
1
4
=
1
2∆
∆−1
2∑
k=1
(
∆− 1
k − 1
)
+
1
4
=
1
2
·
1
2∆−1
∆−1
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆− 1
k
)
+
1
4
.
Since ∆− 1 is even, and again by symmetry of the binomial distribution,
1
2∆−1
∆−1
2
−1∑
k=0
(
∆− 1
k
)
+
1
2
·
1
2∆−1
(
∆− 1
(∆ − 1)/2
)
=
1
2
.
We conclude that
α2(∆) =
1
4
+
1
2
(
1
2
−
1
2∆
(
∆− 1
(∆− 1)/2
))
= α2(∆− 1)
as claimed.
Given this closed-form expression, it is not difficult to show that α2(∆) is non-decreasing in ∆.
Corollary 1. For every ∆ ∈ N, α2(∆ + 1) ≥ α2(∆) and α2(∆ + 2) > α2(∆).
Proof. Since α2(∆) = α2(∆ − 1) for odd ∆ ≥ 3 by Theorem 1, it suffices to show that α2(∆) >
α2(∆− 2) for even ∆ ≥ 4. To this end, note that
α2(∆) =
1
2
−
1
2∆+2
(
∆
∆/2
)
.
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Using three times that
(∆
k
)
=
(∆−1
k−1
)
+
(∆−1
k
)
, we obtain
α2(∆) =
1
2
−
1
2∆+2
((
∆− 2
∆/2− 2
)
+ 2
(
∆− 2
∆/2− 1
)
+
(
∆− 2
∆/2
))
,
and since
(∆−2
k
)
is maximized for k = ∆/2− 1,
α2(∆) >
1
2
−
1
2∆
(
∆− 2
∆/2− 1
)
= α2(∆− 2).
This result implies that a graph with a single edge is in fact the unique worst case for the
2-partition mechanism, and it also yields the first non-trivial lower bound for settings without
abstentions. In the absence of abstentions, one of two conditions is always satisfied: either every
vertex has indegree exactly one, in which case every mechanism including 2-partition is optimal,
or ∆ ≥ 2 and 2-partition is at least α2(∆)-optimal. We will return to this special case, and show
a better bound, in Section 6.
4 The k-Partition Mechanism
What perhaps is most interesting about the above analysis of the 2-partition mechanism is that
the technique we have used to analyse it can in principle also be applied to a partition of the
vertices into more than two sets. Indeed, in this section, we propose a generalization of the 2-
partition mechanism to a larger number of sets and then generalize the analysis technique to the
new mechanism.
For a fixed k ≥ 2, the new mechanism first assigns each vertex i ∈ N independently and
uniformly at random to one of k sets A1, . . . , Ak, such that
⋃
i=1,...,kAi = N , Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j, and P[i ∈ Ai] = 1/k for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The mechanism
then proceeds in k − 1 iterations numbered from 2 to k, during which it maintains and updates a
candidate vertex that is finally selected after iteration k. The candidate is updated if the maximum
indegree among vertices in Aj from vertices in A<j =
⋃j−1
i=1 Ai other than the candidate is at least
that of the candidate at the time it became the candidate. In that case, the new candidate is
chosen uniformly at random from the set of vertices in Aj with maximum indegree from vertices in
A<j =
⋃j−1
i=1 Ai, now including the previous candidate. The mechanism is clearly impartial, because
it only takes into account the outgoing edges of vertices that can no longer be selected. The fact
the any outgoing edges of the previous candidate are taken into account when selecting the new
candidate is somewhat subtle, but it turns out to be crucial for our results. A formal description
of the mechanism is given in Figure 3.
Now consider a graph G = (N,E) ∈ G and a vertex i∗ ∈ N with degree ∆ = ∆(G). Fix k ∈ N,
and let X be the degree of the vertex selected from G by the k-partition mechanism. Note that
X is a random variable subject to the internal randomness of the mechanism, and that we are
interested in its expected value E[X].
We need some notation. For a subset N ′ ⊆ N of the vertices, let Pk(N
′) denote the set
of all partitions S = (S1, . . . , Sk) of N
′ into k (possibly empty) sets S1, . . . , Sk, i.e., Pk(N
′) =
{(S1, . . . , Sk) : Sj ⊆ N
′ for j = 1, . . . , k,
⋃k
j=1 Sj = N
′, Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i, j = 1, . . . , k with i 6= j}.
For a partition S = (S1, . . . , Sk) and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let S<j =
⋃j−1
i=1 Si. For a partition S =
9
Input: Graph G = (N,E)
Output: Vertex i ∈ N
1 Assign each i ∈ N independently and uniformly at random to one of k sets A1, . . . , Ak;
2 Choose i∗ ∈ A1 arbitrarily; set d
∗ := 0;
3 for j = 2, . . . , k do
4 if maxi∈Aj δ
−
A<j\{i∗}
(i) ≥ d∗ then
5 Choose i∗ ∈ argmaxi′∈Aj δ
−
A<j
(i′) uniformly at random; set d∗ := δ−A<j (i
∗);
6 end
7 end
8 Return i∗;
Figure 3: The k-partition mechanism
(S1, . . . , Sk) ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N , we slightly abuse notation and write S\{i} = (S1\{i}, . . . , Sk\{i})
for the partition obtained from S by removing i.
Let A be the partition chosen in Line 1 of the k-Partition mechanism in Figure 3. The following
lemma bounds the expected value of X given that A = S for some given partition S ∈ Pk(N).
Lemma 3. Consider a graph G = (N,E) and a vertex i∗ with degree ∆ = ∆(G). Let S =
(S1, . . . , Sk) ∈ Pk(N), and let j
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that i∗ ∈ Sj∗. Then,
E[X |A = S] ≥ a+ χ(z > a) ·
(
∆− a
)
,
where a = maxj=2,...,kmaxi∈Sj\{i∗} δ
−
S<j
(i) and z = δ−S<j∗ (i
∗).
Proof. For j = 2, . . . , k, let i∗(j) and d∗(j) denote the values of i∗ and d∗ after itera-
tion j of the mechanism. We show by induction on j that for all j = 2, . . . , k, d∗(j) =
maxm=2,...,j maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i).
First consider the case where j = 2. If S2 = ∅, there is nothing to show. Otherwise, the
mechanism chooses a vertex i∗(2) with δ−S<2(i
∗(2)) = δ−S1(i
∗(2)) = maxi∈S2 δ
−
S1
(i), and thus
d∗(2) = δ−S1(i
∗(2)) = max
i∈S2
δ−S1(i).
Now suppose that d∗(j−1) = maxm=2,...,j−1maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i) for some j ∈ {3, . . . , k}. If Sj = ∅,
there again is nothing to show. Otherwise we consider iteration j of the mechanism and distinguish
two cases.
If maxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j\{i∗(j−1)}
(i) ≥ d∗(j − 1), then i∗(j) ∈ argmaxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j
(i) and
d∗(j) = δ−S<j (i
∗(j)) = max
i∈Sj
δ−S<j (i).
Furthermore,
d∗(j) = δ−S<j
(
i∗(j)
)
≥ δ−S<j\{i∗(j−1)}
(
i∗(j)
)
≥ d∗(j − 1) = maxm=2,...,j−1maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i),
where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis. In summary,
d∗(j) = maxm=2,...,j maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i).
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If, on the other hand, maxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j\{i∗(j−1)}
(i) < d∗(j − 1), then i∗(j) = i∗(j − 1) and
d∗(j) = d∗(j − 1) ≥ max
i∈Sj
δ−S<j\{i∗(j−1)}(i) + 1 ≥ maxi∈Sj
δ−S<j (i),
where the first inequality holds because degrees are integral, and the second inequality because
there can be at most one edge from i∗(j − 1) to i∗(j). Furthermore,
d∗(j) = d∗(j − 1) = maxm=2,...,j−1maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i)
where the second equality holds by the induction hypothesis, so again
d∗(j) = maxm=2,...,j maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i).
Since the mechanism returns i∗(k),
E[X |A = S] = δ−(i∗(k)) = d∗(k) = maxj=2,...,kmaxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j
(i)
≥ maxj=2,...,kmaxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j\{i∗}
(i) = a.
To complete the proof, assume that
z = δ−S<j∗ (i
∗) > maxj=2,...,kmaxi∈Sj\{i∗} δ
−
S<j
(i) = a.
Then
δ−S<j∗ (i
∗) > maxm=2,...,j∗−1maxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i) = d∗(j∗ − 1)
and
δ−S<j∗ (i
∗) > maxm=j∗+1,...,kmaxi∈Sm δ
−
S<m
(i),
so i∗(j) = i∗ for j = j∗, . . . , k. The mechanism thus selects i∗, and E[X |A = S, z > a] = ∆.
As in our analysis of the 2-partition mechanism, we now proceed to bound the expected value
of X given that a partition is fixed for all vertices except i∗, and i∗ is then allocated uniformly at
random to one of the k sets.
Lemma 4. Consider a graph G = (N,E) and a vertex i∗ with degree ∆ = ∆(G). Let S =
(S1, . . . , Sk) ∈ Pk(N \ {i
∗}). For j = 1, . . . , k, let zj = δ
−
S<j
(i∗). Then,
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] ≥ minj=1,...,k
{
zj +
k − j
k
(∆ − zj)
}
.
Proof. There are exactly k partitions S′ ∈ P(N) such that S′ \ {i∗} = S, and each of them occurs
with probability 1/k, so
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] =
1
k
k∑
m=1
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S, i∗ ∈ Am].
By Lemma 3,
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] ≥ a(S) +
1
k
k∑
m=1
χ(zm > a(S)) · (∆− a(S)),
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where a(S) = maxj=2,...,kmaxi∈Sj δ
−
S<j
(i). Note that the right-hand side is minimized when a(S) =
zm for some m ∈ {1, . . . , k}, so
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] ≥ minj=1,...,k
{
zj +
1
k
k∑
m=1
χ(zm > zj) · (∆− zj)
}
= minj=1,...,k
{
zj +
1
k
k∑
m=j+1
χ(zm > zj) · (∆− zj)
}
.
Now observe that whenever zj = zj+1 for some j = 2, . . . , k, the respective terms in the minimization
are equal as well. This implies that the minimum will always be attained for some j with zj−1 < zj .
By setting z0 = −1 and simplifying,
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] ≥ minj=1,...,k
zj−1<zj
{
zj +
1
k
k∑
m=j+1
(∆− zj)
}
= minj=1,...,k
zj−1<zj
{
zj +
k − j
k
(∆− zj)
}
.
Since zj +
k−j
k (∆− zj) attains its minimum for some j with zj−1 < zj , we can drop the condition
that zj−1 < zj and obtain
E[X |A \ {i∗} = S] ≥ minj=1,...,k
{
zj +
k − j
k
(∆− zj)
}
as claimed.
To obtain a bound on E[X], we will now average the expression obtained in Lemma 4 over
the distribution on partitions of N . Like the former, the bound we obtain does not depend on
the actual partitions, but only on the indegree δ−Sj (i
∗) of i∗ from each set Sj in the partition. For
∆, k ∈ N, let Pk(∆) = {v ∈ N
k :
∑k
i=1 vi = ∆}. For v ∈ Pk(∆), let
(
∆
v
)
= ∆!v1!···vk ! be the number
of partitions of a set with ∆ elements into k sets of sizes v1, . . . , vk. We then have the following
result.
Lemma 5. On any graph G with maximum degree ∆ = ∆(G), the k-partition mechanism is
αk(∆)-optimal, where
αk(∆) =
1
∆k∆
∑
v∈Pk(∆)
(
∆
v
)
minj=1,...,k
{
k − j
k
k∑
ℓ=1
vℓ +
j
k
j−1∑
ℓ=1
vℓ
}
.
Proof. Consider a vertex i∗ with degree ∆, and note that
E[X] =
∑
S∈Pk(N\{i∗})
P[A \ {i∗} = S] · E[X |A \ {i∗} = S].
For S ∈ Pk(N \ {i
∗}), let zj(S) = δ
−
S<j
(i∗). Then, by Lemma 4,
E[X] ≥
∑
S∈Pk(N\{i∗})
P[A \ {i∗} = S] ·minj=1,...,k
{
zj(S) +
k − j
k
(∆− zj(S))
}
.
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For S ∈ Pk(N \ {i
∗}), let vj(S) = δ
−
Sj
(i∗). Then, zj(S) =
∑j−1
m=1 vm(S), and
E[X] ≥
∑
S∈Pk(N\{i∗})
P[A \ {i∗} = S] ·minj=1,...,k
{
j−1∑
m=1
vm(S) +
k − j
k
k∑
m=j
vm(S)
}
=
∑
S∈Pk(N\{i∗})
P[A \ {i∗} = S] ·minj=1,...,k
{
k − j
k
k∑
m=1
vm(S) +
j
k
j−1∑
m=1
vm(S)
}
.
Since (z1(S), . . . , zk(S)) follows a multinomial distribution with ∆ trials and success probability
1/k for each category, we have that
E[X] ≥
1
k∆
∑
v∈Pk(∆)
(
∆
v
)
minj=1,...,k
{
k − j
k
k∑
ℓ=1
vℓ +
j
k
j−1∑
ℓ=1
vℓ
}
,
and the claim follows.
In the case of the 2-partition mechanism, we obtained a lower bound on the degree of optimality
by deriving a closed-form expression for α(∆) = α2(∆) that turned out to be monotonically non-
decreasing in ∆. While the complexity of αk prevents us from taking the same route for k > 2,
monotonicity turns out to hold for any value of k.
Theorem 2. For any k ≥ 2, αk(∆) is non-decreasing in ∆.
Proof. We can reformulate the bound of Lemma 5 to obtain that
αk(∆) =
1
∆k∆
∑
v∈Pk(∆)
(
∆
v
)
minj=1,...,k
{
k − j
k
k∑
ℓ=1
vℓ +
j
k
j−1∑
ℓ=1
vℓ
}
=
1
∆k∆
∑
v∈Pk(∆)
(
∆
v
)
minj=1,...,k〈v,w
j,k〉,
where wj,k ∈ Qk with wj,ki = 1 if i < j and w
j,k
i = (k − j)/k otherwise.
Instead of summing over all vectors v ∈ Pk(∆), we may instead sum over all vectors v
′ ∈
Pk(∆ + 1) and decrease one of the non-zero entries v
′
i by 1. Thus,
αk(∆) =
1
∆k∆+1
∑
vPk(∆+1)
(
∆+ 1
v
)
1
∆+ 1
k∑
i=1
viminj=1,...,k〈v − e
i,k,wj,k〉,
where ei,k is the ith unit vector in k dimensions, i.e., ei,kℓ = 1 if ℓ = i and e
i,k
ℓ = 0 otherwise.
If we exchange the order of the summation over i and the minimization over j, the value of the
expression can only increase, so
αk(∆) ≤
1
∆k∆+1
∑
v∈P (∆+1)
(
∆+ 1
v
)
1
∆ + 1
minj=1,...,k
k∑
i=1
vi〈v − e
i,k,wj,k〉
=
1
(∆ + 1)k∆+1
∑
v∈Pk(∆+1)
(
∆+ 1
v
)
1
∆
minj=1,...,k
k∑
i=1
(
vi〈v,w
j,k〉 − viw
j,k
i
)
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=
1
(∆ + 1)k∆+1
∑
v∈Pk(∆+1)
(
∆+ 1
v
)
1
∆
minj=1,...,k
(
〈v,wj,k〉
k∑
i=1
vi − 〈v,w
j,k〉
)
=
1
(∆ + 1)k∆+1
∑
v∈Pk(∆+1)
(
∆+ 1
v
)
minj=1,...,k〈v,w
j,k〉
= αk(∆ + 1)
Monotonicity of αk allows us to obtain a lower bound on the degree of optimality of the k-
partition mechanism by bounding αk(1) from below. The following is our main result.
Theorem 3. The k-partition mechanism for k ≥ 2 is k−12k -optimal.
Proof. In light of Theorem 2, it suffices to show that αk(1) ≥
k−1
2k for every k ≥ 2.
By Lemma 5,
αk(1) =
1
k
∑
v∈Pk(1)
minj=1,...,k
{
k − j
k
k∑
ℓ=1
vℓ +
j
k
j−1∑
ℓ=1
vℓ
}
Taking the pointwise minimum,
α1(k) ≥
1
k
∑
v∈Pk(1)
〈
v,
(k − 1
k
,
k − 2
k
, . . . ,
1
k
, 0
)〉
In the sum, every unit vector occurs exactly once, and thus
αk(1) ≥
1
k
k∑
i=1
k − i
k
=
1
k2
k−1∑
i=0
i =
k(k − 1)
2k2
=
k − 1
2k
.
5 The Permutation Mechanism
We have started from the simple result that no impartial selection mechanism can be more than
1/2-optimal, and in the previous section identified a class of mechanisms parameterized by k ∈ N
that attains this bound in the limit as k goes to infinity. It turns out that the bound can also
be attained exactly, by a limiting mechanism for the above class. This mechanism, which we call
the permutation mechanism, considers the vertices one by one according to a random permutation
π = (π1, . . . , πn) and in each step campares the current vertex πj to a single candidate vertex πℓ
with ℓ < j. In determining the degree of the candidate vertex πℓ it takes into account the outgoing
edges of vertices π1, . . . , πℓ−1. For the degree of the current vertex πj it takes into account the
outgoing edges of vertices π1, . . . , πj−1, except πℓ. If the latter is greater than or equal than the
former, πj becomes the new candidate vertex, and the candidate vertex after the final step is the
one selected by the mechanism. Again it is easy to see that this mechanism is impartial, because
it only takes into account the outgoing edges of vertices that can no longer be selected. A formal
description of the mechanism is given in Figure 4, and we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4. The permutation mechanism is 1/2-optimal.
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Input: Graph G = (N,E)
Output: Vertex i ∈ N
1 Choose a permutation
(
π1, . . . , π|N |
)
of N uniformly at random;
2 Set i∗ := π1, d
∗ := 0;
3 for j = 2, . . . , |N | do
4 if δ−π<j\{i∗}(πj) ≥ d
∗ then
5 Set i∗ := πj , d
∗ := δ−π<j (πj);
6 end
7 end
8 return i∗;
Figure 4: The permutation mechanism
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a graph G = (N,E) such that the
permutation mechanism is strictly less than 1/2-optimal on G. Let n = |N | and ∆ = ∆(G), and
denote by X and by Xk for k ≥ 2 the degree of the vertex respectively selected from G by the
permutation and k-partition mechanisms. Note that X and Xk are random variables subject to the
internal randomness of the respective mechanism. Finally let α = E[X]/∆, and note that α < 1/2
by assumption.
The outcomes of the permutation mechanism and the k-partition mechanism agree under the
condition that the partition (A1, . . . , Ak) chosen by the latter satisfies |Ai| ≤ for i = 1, . . . , k, so
E[X] ≥ P
[
|Ai| ≤ 1 for i = 1 . . . , k
]
· E[Xk].
For any k ≥ n,
P
[
|Ai| ≤ 1 for i = 1 . . . , k
]
=
k · (k − 1) · . . . · (k − n+ 1)
kn
≥
(k − n)n
kn
,
and thus
E[X] ≥
k − n+ 1
k
E[Xk] ≥
(k − n)n
kn
k − 1
2k
∆,
where the second inequality follows from Theorem 3. For any fixed n,
lim
k→∞
(
(k − n)n
kn
k − 1
2k
)
=
1
2
> α,
and we can choose k such that
(k − n)n
kn
k − 1
2k
> α.
Therefore, E[X] > α∆, a contradiction.
A potential downside of the permutation mechanism is that it considers agents one by one and
therefore cannot process nominations anonymously. This may be of concern in situations where
agents do not want their opinion regarding other agents to be publicly known. In the k-partition
mechanism for some fixed value of k, on the other hand, the nominations submitted by agents in
block Aj of the partition can be processed simultaneously and thus with partial anonymity. It
is an interesting question whether this tradeoff between anonymity and approximate optimality
is intrinsic to the problem, or whether there exits a different mechanism that achieves the same
degree of optimality as the permutation mechanism but a higher degree of anonymity.
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6 No Abstentions
Let us finally consider the interesting special case of graphs in which every vertex has outdegree at
least 1. This case corresponds to settings without abstentions and in particular includes the setting
of Holzman and Moulin [13], where every agent submits exactly one nomination. In Section 3
we obtained an improved lower bound of 3/8 instead of 1/4 for the special case using the simple
observation that the 2-partition mechanism is optimal on graphs with maximum degree 1 and we
can therefore focus on graphs with maximum degree at most 2. The same argument can be applied
to the k-partition mechanism as well.
Let G+n = {(N,E) ∈ Gn : mini∈N δ
+(i, (N,E)) ≥ 1}, where δ+(i, (N,E)) = |{(i, j) ∈ E : j ∈
N}}|, and G+ =
⋃
n∈N G
+
n . The following lemma provides an alternative expression for αk(2), which
will subsequently be used to derive an improved bound.
Lemma 6. On any graph G with maximum degree ∆(G) = 2, the k-partition mechanism for k ≥ 2
is αk(2)-optimal, where
αk(2) = 1−
1
k3
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k}
max
{
max{x1, x2}
2
,min{x1, x2}
}
.
Proof. Let k ≥ 2. Consider a graph G = (N,E) with ∆(G) = 2, and note that there must exist
i1, i2, i
∗ ∈ N such that i1 6= i2 and {(i1, i
∗), (i2, i
∗)} ⊆ E. Consider the partition A = (A1, . . . , Ak)
chosen by the k-partition mechanism and let x1, x2, y ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that i1 ∈ Ax1 , i2 ∈ Ax2 ,
and i∗ ∈ Ay. Note that x1, x2, and y are independent random variables distributed uniformly on
{1, . . . , k}. Denote xˆ = max{x1, x2}, and xˇ = min{x1, x2}. Then, by Lemma 4,
αk(2) ≥
1
2
·
1
k3
∑
x1,x2,y∈{1,...,k}
(
2χ
(
y > xˆ
)
+ χ
(
y ≤ xˆ
)
· χ
(
xˆ ≤ 2(xˆ− xˇ)
)
+
2χ
(
xˇ ≤ y ≤ xˆ
)
· χ
(
2(xˆ− xˇ) < xˆ
))
=
1
k2
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k}
(
k − xˆ
k
+
1
2
·
xˆ
k
· χ
(
2xˇ ≤ xˆ
)
+
xˆ− xˇ
k
· χ
(
2xˇ > xˆ
))
=
1
k2
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k}
(
1−
xˆ
2k
· χ
(
2xˇ ≤ xˆ
)
−
xˇ
k
· χ
(
2xˇ > xˆ
))
= 1−
1
k3
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k}
max
{
xˆ
2
, xˇ
}
.
We are now in a position to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. The permutation mechanism is 7/12-optimal on G+.
Proof. Let G = (N,E) ∈ G+. If ∆(G) = 1, then δ−(i,G) = 1 for all i ∈ N and every mechanism,
including the permutation mechanism, is optimal on G. If ∆(G) ≥ 2, then by Lemma 5, Theorem 2,
and Lemma 6, the k-partition mechanism is αk(2)-optimal on G, where αk(2) = 1− βk/k
3 with
βk =
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k}
max
{
max{x1, x2}
2
,min{x1, x2}
}
.
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Figure 5: A graph on which the permutation mechanism is 2/3-optimal
Now,
βk =
∑
x1,x2∈{1,...,k−1}
max
{
max{x1, x2}
2
,min{x1, x2}
}
+
∑
x2∈{1,...,k−1}
max
{
max{k, x2}
2
,min{k, x2}
}
+
∑
x1∈{1,...,k−1}
max
{
max{x1, k}
2
,min{x1, k}
}
+ k
= βk−1 + k + 2
∑
x1∈{1,dots,k−1}
max
{
k
2
, x1
}
= βk−1 +
5
4
k2 + o(k2)
Since β1 = 1,
βk = 1 +
k∑
ℓ=1
(
5
4
k2 + o(k2)
)
=
5
12
k3 + o(k3)
and thus
αk(2) =
7
12
+
o(k3)
k3
.
This expression tends to 7/12 as k tends to infinity, and the claim follows by the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 4.
One may wonder whether this bounds is tight, for the permutation mechanism or even in
general. We leave this as an open question, but conclude by giving upper bounds of 2/3 and 3/4,
respectively, on possible values of α for the permutation mechanism and any impartial mechanism.
To see that the permutation mechanism cannot be more than 2/3-optimal, consider the graph of
Figure 5. The unique vertex with degree 3 in this graph is selected by the permutation mechanism if
and only if it appears in the last two positions of the permutation, which happens with probability
1/2. Indeed, when it appears in one of the first two positions it has degree at most 1 at the time it
is considered by the mechanism. At the same time, one of the vertices in the last two positions has
degree 1 when it is considered and consequently gets selected. The expected degree of the selected
vertex is thus 3 · 1/2 + 1 · 1/2 = 2, compared to a maximum degree of 3. What is interesting about
this bound is that it is attained for a graph with maximum degree 3. This suggests that a matching
lower bound could not be obtained from a monotonicity result like that of Theorem 2.
The same upper bound of 2/3 holds asymptotically for the more restricted case considered by
Holzman and Moulin [13] where every vertex has outdegree one. To see this, consider the graph
G = (N,E) with N = {1, . . . , n} and E = {(i, i + 1) : i = 1, . . . , n − 2} ∪ {(n − 1, 1), (n, 1)}, and
observe that the permutation mechanism selects vertex 1, the unique vertex with degree 2, with
significant probability only for permutations in which vertices n − 1 and n both occur before 1.
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p1 p1 p1
Figure 6: Impartial probability assignment for two graphs with n = 3
p1 p1
p1p1
p2 p2
p1
p2
Figure 7: Impartial probability assignment for three graphs with n = 4
Since the latter happens with probability exactly 1/3, the expected degree of the selected vertex is
not significantly greater than 2 · 1/3 + 1 · 2/3 = 4/3, compared to a maximum degree of 2.
Our final result establishes upper bounds on α for any mechanism that is impartial and α-
optimal on G+, and for different values of n. Intuitively these bounds arise as dual solutions of an
optimization problem characterizing the α-optimal impartial mechanisms for the maximum value
of α. These dual solutions are optimal, and the upper bound therefore tight, for n ≤ 7.
Theorem 6. Consider an impartial selection mechanism that is α-optimal on G+n . Then
α ≥
{
3/4 if n = 3,
(3n − 1)/4n otherwise.
Proof. By Lemma 1 we can restrict our attention to symmetric mechanisms.
First assume that n = 3, and consider the two graphs shown in Figure 6. It is easily verified
that any impartial mechanism must assign probabilities as shown, and it must therefore be the case
that p1 ≤
1
2 . In the graph on the right, the agent assigned probability p1 is the unique agent with
the maximum indegree of 2, and thus
α ≤
2p1 + (1− p1)
2
=
p1 + 1
2
≤
3
4
.
Now asume that n ≥ 4 even, and consider the set of three graphs on n agents where agents 1
to 4 vote as in Figure 7 and the remaining n − 4 agents are grouped in pairs such that agent 2i
votes for agent 2i− 1 and vice versa. It is easily verified that any impartial mechanism must assign
probabilities as in Figure 7, and thus np1 = 1 and p1 + 2p2 ≤ 1. Moreover, the agent assigned
probability p2 in the rightmost graph is the unique agent with indegree 2 in that graph, and thus
α ≤
2p2 + (1− p2)
2
=
p2 + 1
2
≤
n−1
2n + 1
2
=
3n − 1
4n
.
18
p1
p1
p1
p1p1
p4
p5
p1
p2p3
p6
p5
p2p3
p4
p7
p7
p6
p7
Figure 8: Impartial probability assignment for six graphs with n = 5
Now asume that n = 5, and consider the six graphs shown in Figure 8. It is easily verified that
any impartial mechanism must assign probabilities as in Figure 8, so
p1 = 1/5, (2)
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 = 1, (3)
p2 + p3 + p5 + p6 ≤ 1, (4)
p4 + 2p7 ≤ 1. (5)
By adding (2), (4), and (5) and subtracting (3),
p6 + 2p7 ≤
6
5
and thus min(p6, p7) ≤
2
5
.
The agents assigned probabilities p6 and p7 in the two rightmost graphs in the bottom row of
Figure 8 are the unique agents with indegree 2 in those graphs, so
α ≤
2p6 + (1− p6)
2
=
p6 + 1
2
and α ≤
2p6 + (1− p6)
2
=
p6 + 1
2
,
and thus
α ≤
min(p6, p7) + 1
2
≤
2
5 + 1
2
=
7
10
=
3n− 1
4n
.
Finally assume that n ≥ 7 odd, and consider the set of five graphs on n agents where agents 1
to 7 vote as in Figure 9 and the remaining n − 7 agents are grouped in pairs such that agent 2i
votes for agent 2i− 1 and vice versa. It is easily verified that any impartial mechanism must assign
probabilities as in Figure 9, so
(n− 3)p1 + 3p2 = 1,
p1 + 2p3 ≤ 1,
p2 + 2p4 ≤ 1.
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Figure 9: Impartial probability assignment for five graphs with n = 7
The agents assigned probabilities p3 and p4 in the two rightmost graphs are the unique agents with
indegree 2 in those graphs, so
α ≤
2p3 + (1− p3)
2
=
p3 + 1
2
≤
1−p1
2 + 1
2
=
3− p1
4
,
α ≤
2p4 + (1− p4)
2
=
p4 + 1
2
≤
1−p2
2 + 1
2
=
3− p2
4
,
and thus
α ≤
3−max(p1, p2)
4
≤
3− 1n
4
=
3n − 1
4n
,
where the second inequality holds because max(p1, p2) ≥ 1/n.
Somewhat surprisingly, restricting the set of graphs even further, by requiring that every vertex
has outdegree exactly 1, does not enable significantly better impartial mechanism. Using similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6, it can be shown that in this case any impartial and α-
optimal mechanism must satisfy α ≤ 5/6 if n = 3, α ≤ (6n− 1)/8n if n ≥ 6 and even, and α ≤ 3/4
otherwise. These bounds are tight for n ≤ 9.
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